2. Zahra-OA-On-BJP-Fou-Oped thumbnail-April-2026-APP

India projects itself as one of the most vibrant democracies in the world, but its rankings in global risk indices present a fundamentally different picture. Notably, in 2025, India ranked fourth among 168 countries at risk of future mass killings of civilians, behind Myanmar, Chad, and Sudan.

One is compelled to ask: How did a country, founded on the Gandhian principles of non-violence and the welfare of all, lose its moral direction? And how, if at all, can these ideals be rebuilt?

6 April, the foundation day of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), offers an opportunity to reflect on these questions.

The BJP was established in 1980, evolving from the political arm of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). While RSS was founded in 1925 as a Hindu nationalist volunteer organisation, its ideological foundations were laid more than a decade earlier inside a prison cell. V.D. Savarkar developed the ideology of Hindutva, conceptualising India as a Hindu dominion and a Hindu as an individual who considered India as both their fatherland and holy land.

However, the popular appeal of any ideology depends on the relative strength of its countervailing force/s. By the time Hindutva was crystallised and the RSS was founded, Mahatma Gandhi, a staunch advocate of cultural harmony, had already built a stronghold in the hearts and minds of the masses, having transformed the Indian National Congress into a mass organisation. Although Gandhi was assassinated soon after independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister, sustained Gandhi’s legacy.

The turning point arguably came with Nehru’s death in 1964. Indira Gandhi, who assumed office two years later, pursued centralisation of power, gradually weakening the party’s grassroots support base and enabling a coalition of opposition parties, including the RSS’s political arm, to break its nearly three-decade-long rule in 1977. While Indira Gandhi was able to reassume the premiership in 1980, the coalition’s RSS-affiliated group capitalised on the legitimacy gained during the brief rule, establishing the BJP the same year. As Congress increasingly resorted to religious politics, it inadvertently expanded the BJP’s ideological space. By 2000, the BJP was leading a coalition at the centre, although it lacked leaders with Nehru-Gandhi-level mass appeal, and was replaced by a Congress-led coalition in 2004.

But in the background, Narendra Modi, an RSS member who was sent to the BJP in 1987, was already building his profile to fill this void. After establishing a reputation within the party, he was appointed Chief Minister of Gujarat in 2001 following a crisis in the BJP-led state government. Modi quickly built his appeal by connecting directly with the masses, aided by his powerful oratory and the coinciding events, allowing him to mobilise Hindu nationalist sentiment.

Notably, in 2002, a train burning incident occurred in Gujarat, resulting in the death of dozens of Hindus. The state government quickly blamed a Muslim mob, triggering riots and leading to a mass massacre of Muslims. A later central government’s investigation described the train incident as an accident originating within the coach, while overwhelming evidence points to the Modi government’s involvement in the massacre that followed.

Modi went on to win successive Gujarat elections by projecting himself as an unapologetic Hindu nationalist and a pro-business reformer, was nominated as the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate in 2013, and secured a decisive majority in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. He was re-elected with an even stronger mandate in 2019.

With polarisation politics having paid consistent political dividends, and the BJP’s Muslim representation in the parliament already having declined sharply, the Modi government, following 2019, systematically invisibilised Muslims, despite the latter constituting around 14 per cent of the Indian population. Notably, the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019 removed the autonomy of the Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK), India’s only Muslim-majority state, while the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) fast-tracked Indian citizenship for non-Muslim migrants from neighbouring countries, disregarding Muslims. In making Muslims irrelevant, the BJP also aimed to sideline a potential voter base for the Congress, thus consolidating its hold on power.

In 2024, however, while Modi won a third consecutive term, he failed to secure an outright majority. Although some tend to suggest that this pointed to a realisation among the Indians of the consequences of the BJP’s hate-ridden policies, there exists another dynamic warranting a deeper look.

From 2014 onwards, Modi intensified the anti-Pakistan posture to amplify the population’s nationalist sentiments. The BJP actively used tensions with Pakistan, including in 2016 and 2019, to bolster its electoral appeal. The 2024 elections, on the other hand, were held without a preceding military escalation against Pakistan. The tragedy of tying political stakes to such discourses is that, when consistently repeated, they are internalised by populations, thereby shaping their expectations. This not just raises questions about the timing of India’s subsequent 2025 escalation with Pakistan but also explains the ever-increasing use of anti-Pakistan rhetoric by both Indian civilian leaders and military officials in recent months.

While these extremist tendencies presently show no signs of abating, they are certainly not irreversible. The path to reversal is challenging, but history shows that populations can change the course of nations, provided they are steered in the right direction by torchbearers who can win popular appeal by disseminating a clear and principled alternative narrative. Modi’s relative decline in popularity in the 2024 national elections, and the impact that these Hindutva policies have already been having on the Hindu population, without many being cognisant of it, suggest that the political space for such alternatives exists but must be actively claimed.

The writer is a Research Associate at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad. The article was first published in Daily Times. She can be reached at: [email protected].


Share this article

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Recent Publications

Browse through the list of recent publications.

The US-Israel War on Iran: Objectives, Strategy, and Escalation Management

Zahra Niazi
‘States tend to overestimate themselves or the benefits and swiftness of war, and to underestimate their opponents’ capabilities, intentions, or the costs and duration of war.’ If anything, the 2026 war initiated by the United States and Israel against Iran shall be remembered in the annals of warfare among the most visible manifestations of this dynamic.
The war, immediately preceded by the January mass protests in Iran, did not represent a sudden rupture but rather the continuation of a 47-year-long confrontation and a more intense phase of the June 2025 war.
The US Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, defined the war’s objectives as being laser-focused: to destroy Iran’s missile capabilities and its security infrastructure, while ensuring that it could never develop nuclear weapons. Beyond these stated objectives, among the priorities on the continuum also lay the objective of regime change, with both President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu explicitly calling on the Iranian population to take over the government at the outset of the war.

Read More »

Marka-e-Haq to the Peace Talks: Pakistan’s Middle Power Status

On 7th May 2025, Pakistan’s military forces took the international security community by surprise when it demonstrated operational superiority against its larger belligerent adversary India with its rapid and coordinated response. The Four-Day conflict proved to be a watershed moment for Pakistan, marking its rapid emergence as an important player in the region. In recent years, amidst the ongoing global competition between the United States and China, Islamabad has adopted a position of ’Strategic Balancing,’ where it maintains ties of cooperation with both Beijing and Washington. Deft diplomacy, emphasis on geo-economics, and credible conventional and strategic deterrence have remained the foundational pillars for Pakistan’s ambition as a rising middle power

Read More »

Debunking the S-400 Shield: Lessons from the India-Pakistan Conflict

Air defense has always been a central aspect of warfare. In South Asia, the phenomenon carries immense significance due to compressed reaction times. In this context, one of the most-hyped systems is the Russian-made S-400, touted by New Delhi as a one-stop solution to counter aerial threats from both Pakistan and China.
The 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan marked an important chapter in testing the S-400 technology. The conflict began on May 7, when India attacked what it alleged were terrorist targets in both Pakistani-held Kashmir and Pakistan proper, using drone and missile strikes. The conflict lasted for four days, culminating in a U.S-facilitated ceasefire. However, the brief conflict debunked a lot of the myths regarding the S-400 technology.
First, India claimed that the mobile S-400 would be able to control Pakistan’s airspace. In contrast, Pakistani aircraft continued to operate freely, according to official briefings by the Pakistani military. Although the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) aircraft were in their own airspace, they were still within the air defense range.

Read More »