Picture1

The eruption of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine in early 2022 left many observers worried about the state of the world in several domains: the disruption to the global economy, the application of cross-domain warfare, and the disordering of the international political order. The breakneck speed at which events unfolded, and the constant media attention towards the conflict, led to a general sense of disorientation and ambiguity about the path-dependency of the belligerents, not least because of the nuclear umbrella under which war was being waged. However, this disorientation should not detract from the important interdisciplinary questions that scholars can begin to ask, particularly in the field of economics, as they proceed to contextualize such a significant global event.

By no means downplaying the scale of devastation that the conflict has unleashed, it is nevertheless worth delineating several ambits of economic research that can be informed by the developments in Ukraine, Russia, and the wider world contemporaneously within the prism of ongoing strife. Economics might, at first glance, not appear to be the most salient aspect of research in an otherwise multidimensional conventional war, but it has (1) played a significant role in terms of the toolkit of Western retaliation, and (2) had the largest aftershocks in terms of disrupting the global economy, with far flung nations bearing an economic brunt even if their governments express a sense of distance from the kinetic outcomes of the conflict.

First is the choice of economics as a war domain. Although Russia chose traditional kinetic warfare as the primary domain of engagement (and supported it with hybrid operations), the West has largely chosen economics as the counter-domain for retaliation. This might prevent the escalation ladder from being breached and the scope of belligerents from expanding, while also enabling “stroke of the pen” means to be undertaken without bloodshed for the West. At the same time, it also means that the Ukrainian military & civilian defense remains under-equipped relative to the Russian adversary in the domain that Russia chose. As such, there are various lessons for strategist-economists in ascertaining how quickly and readily economics is chosen as the domain of war, but then in considering how it measures against other domains in terms of intensity and effectiveness.

Second, and closely related, is the imposition of sanctions regimes. The list of punitive measures imposed on Russia now make it the most heavily-sanctioned country in the world. Yet the effectiveness of the sanctions regime imposed on Russia is shaped by a variety of factors including (1) the participation of countries (for & against), (2) the targeted entities & individuals, (3) the internal cohesion of institutions and individuals in Russia, (4) the self-dependency of the Russian economy, (5) the duration of the conflict, and (6) countermeasures and retaliatory actions taken by Russia. The current conflict therefore offers fresh insights into the effectiveness of sanctions regimes, which are often seen as excessively punitive towards publics instead of state actors, and generally ineffective at regime change or deterrence.

Third, and closely tied to Pakistan’s perspective, is the concept of economic security. The term “economic security” is interpreted differently by different audiences, but insofar as the National Security Policy (NSP) of Pakistan (as an example) is concerned, it tends to mean the buildup of diversified foreign reserves to withstand shocks, and economic security is thus a means of building resilience. Russia had undertaken considerable preparation since 2014 to boost its economic security, with a massive war chest of roughly $630 billion that was well-diversified across gold, euros, yuan, dollars, and other assets. However, the sanctions and delimitations that the West imposed meant that a portion of these reserves, enmeshed in the international financial system as they were, could not be easily accessed. Therefore, there are significant lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in terms of economic security strategies, particularly in terms of fine-tuning them to cater for complexity and interdependence in the international economy.

Fourth, and no less important, is the wider question of dollar hegemony & commodities. The weeks since the eruption of conflict have led to interesting news flow regarding countries’ desire to hold and use the US dollar as reserve currency, as for example in Saudi-China discussions on a wider petro yuan trade, or in Russo-Chinese discussions along similar lines. What was once seen as a core asset (or at least exorbitant privilege) of the United States as master of the global reserve currency is being increasingly rebuffed for alternatives. In addition, the utility of cryptocurrencies and other alternate stores of wealth has also gained attention; as have efforts to regulate them. The Russian central bank’s own strategy of protecting the ruble also gives insights into wartime economic operations. At the same time, the volatility in commodity markets and national strategies to combat inflationary pressures are presenting interesting lessons for financial research, which may in time suggest that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict was an accelerator of currency shifts that reflected new economic realities.

Fifth, and finally, lies the research question of geopolitical/geo-economics primacy. Economists often proceed with assumptions about human and institutional rationality that would put reasoned economic self-interest at the core, which leads them to assume that a country will put its geo-economics interests and economic stability above all other considerations. Yet the Russo-Ukrainian conflict demonstrates that the Kremlin’s calculus incorporated geopolitical and (non-economic) geostrategic considerations, even at the cost of short-to-medium term (and perhaps longer) economic hardship, which citizens are facing due to retaliatory economic isolation. Other countries too have overridden purely economic-market logics to attempt to attain other objectives which matter equally (if not more) to the state and its inner sanctum. The current conflict should be seen in light of competing logics where economics does not (or no longer) holds primacy.

Although the foregoing list is by no means comprehensive, it touches upon key areas of economic research in a multidisciplinary context that also extend far beyond Eastern Europe, and can be seen through the prism of other regions as time proceeds and dynamics with a greater semblance to the current conflict arise elsewhere. With this in mind, researchers should consider the prospects of learning carefully from the lessons of the unfortunate Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

Dr. Usman W. Chohan is the Director for Economic Affairs and National Development at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad, Pakistan. He can be reached at [email protected].

Image Source: Culverhouse, S. 2020, “Ukraine Central Bank independence under threat,” Tellimer, July 13, https://tellimer.com/article/ukraine-central-bank-independence-under-threa.


Share this article

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Recent Publications

Browse through the list of recent publications.

The Cover-up: IAF Narrative of the May 2025 Air Battle

Even after one year since the India-Pakistan May war of 2025, the Indian discourse regarding Operation Sindoor remains uncertain under its pretence of restraint. The Pahalgam attack on 22 April, which killed 26 people, triggered an escalatory spiral. New Delhi quickly accused Pakistan-linked elements, while Islamabad refuted the allegation and demanded an independent investigation. On 7 May, India launched attacks deep inside Pakistan under what it later termed as Operation Sindoor. The political motive was intended to turn the crisis into coercive signalling by shifting the blame onto the enemy and projecting a sense of military superiority.
This episode, however, began to fray immediately as war seldom follows the intended script. Within minutes PAF shot down 7 IAF aircraft including 4 Rafales. On 8 May, Reuters reported that at least two Indian aircraft were shot down by a Pakistani J-10C, while the local government sources reported other aircraft crashes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir

Read More »

Why the IAF’s Post-Sindoor Spending Surge is a Sign of Panic

After Operation Sindoor, India is spending billions of dollars on new weapons. This is being taken by many people as an indication of military prowess. It is not. This rush to procure weapons is in fact an acknowledgement that the Air Force in India had failed to do what it was meant to do. The costly jets and missiles that India had purchased over the years failed to yield the promised results.

Sindoor was soon followed by India in sealing the gaps which the operation had exposed. It was reported that Indian Air Force (IAF) is looking to speed up its purchases of more than 7 billion USD. This will involve other Rafale fighter jets with India already ordering 26 more Rafales to the Navy in 2024 at an estimated cost of about 3.9 billion USD. India is also seeking long-range standoff missiles, Israeli loitering munitions and increased drone capabilities. Special financial powers of the Indian military were activated to issue emergency procurement orders. The magnitude and rate of these purchases speak volumes.

Indian media and defence analysts have over the years considered the Rafale as a game changer. When India purchased 36 Rafales aircrafts at an approximate cost of 8.7 billion USD, analysts vowed that the aircraft would provide India with air superiority over Pakistan. Operation Sindoor disproved all those allegations. Indian aircraft did not even fly in Pakistani airspace when the fighting started. India solely depended on standoff weapons that were launched at a safe distance. The air defence system of Pakistan, comprising of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system and its own fighters, stood its ground.

Read More »

May 2025: Mosaic Warfare and the Myth of Centralised Air Power

Visualise a modern-day Air Force commander sitting in the operations room, miles away from the combat zone, overseeing every friendly and enemy aircraft and all assets involved in the campaign. In a split second, he can task a fighter, reposition a drone, and authorise a strike. In today’s promising technological era, he does not even need an operations room; a laptop on his desktop will suffice. The situation looks promising as it offers efficiency, precision, and control. The term used for such operational control is ‘centralisation’, which has been made possible with advanced networking, integrating space, cyber, surveillance, artificial intelligence, and seamless communication, enabling a single commander to manage an entire campaign from a single node. Centralised command and control, championed by the Western air forces and then adopted by many others, has thus been seen as a pinnacle of modern military power.
The concept of centralisation, enabled by state-of-the-art networking, may seem promising, but it is nothing more than a myth.

Read More »