3. Sajal Shahid-OA-Qua-Com-Dou-Oped thumbnail-November-2025-APP

In September 2025, scientists from Japan were finally able to identify the elusive W-state of quantum entanglement, solving a decades-old problem and potentially paving the way for powerful new quantum technologies. This was preceded by another breakthrough, just months earlier in April, in which the UK scientists conducted the first-ever long-distance data transfer using quantum networks. Though these rapid advancements have built much anticipation around the technology’s potential, questions regarding the extent of its practical applicability and associated risks remain unanswered.

Since its conceptual birth in 1935, quantum technology was granted the status of a revolutionary force across a variety of sectors, communications in particular. For instance, quantum networks could potentially create unbreakable encryption systems through Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). It allows the sender and the receiver to encrypt and decrypt data over a secure channel. The communication parties are alerted to any intrusion attempt through disturbance in the quantum state.

Theoretically, quantum technology offers unprecedented security across various domains through its ‘unhackable’ communication lines. The benefits are unparalleled, such as secure commercial and diplomatic channels as well as interception-resistant defence networks.

In the military domain, the quantum networks could counter the threat of data interception in both ground-based and satellite communication. Practically, these networks are useful for the protection of early warning systems and command links from foreign penetration. The prospect is particularly significant in modern warfare, where cyberattacks often precede physical ones. Moreover, quantum communication satellites create secure global communication links for the transmission of real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data. This could grant militaries the advantage of secure and reliable channels for data transfers and attain global reach. Though in the development process, China’s Micius satellite system serves as the first example of a secure long-distance QKD-enabled communication network.

While its theoretical applications are numerous, quantum communication has yet to reach a high level of practical applicability. Experts deem it unlikely that quantum technology will reach the level of sophistication required to implement it in real-world scenarios in the foreseeable future.

While the technology offers many benefits, it likewise carries risks, some of which may even negate its benefits altogether. Though the encrypted nature of QKD-based quantum communication protects it from virtual intrusion, it simultaneously increases the risk of physical disruption as the only traditional method of interruption available. This potentially increases the likelihood of insider threats. Free-space quantum communication through drones and satellites evades the threat of hardware manipulation. However, it is vulnerable to cyberattacks as it transfers data by using lasers through open air rather than QKD fibre-optic cables.

Furthermore, custom-made equipment is required for quantum communication networks. Such equipment is not only costly but also hard to upgrade to keep pace with the evolving threats. The high cost gives an advantage to the developed nations. For instance, the US and China, with their exponential financial capacities, are at the forefront of developing this technology.

Moreover, quantum computing has the capacity to disrupt existing communication channels. Future developments may allow quantum networks to decode the existing encryption methods. The prevalent encryption methods, such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which employ traditional mathematical means of encryption, are said to be particularly at risk. The threat has already started to surface as malicious actors are reported to be collecting encrypted data to decrypt it through quantum computing in the future. The strategy is called ‘Harvest Now, Decrypt Later’ (HNDL).

While developments in quantum computing and subsequently quantum communication offer revolutionary benefits, it is a double-edged sword. The idea of ‘unhackable’ quantum communication lines currently remains a fantasy.

Countries such as Pakistan that are in the nascent stages of quantum development must carefully check their enchantment with this technology to keep pace with global developments as well as being aware of its risks. Initiatives such as the National Centre for Quantum Computing and the Centre of Excellence for Technology, Quantum and AI Pakistan (CETQAP) are the steps in the right direction. Moreover, testing, verification, and investment in Research & Development (R&D) are necessary to ensure that future vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies are identified, securing the communication networks.

Sajal Shahid is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS) Islamabad. She can be reached at [email protected]


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