1. Mustafa Bilal-OA-Eur-Spa-Mer-Les-10 Dec-2025-Oped thumbnail-January-2026-APP

The announcement on 23 October that Airbus, Thales and Leonardo will merge their satellite operations was a historic development for the European space industry. The plan aims to establish a new combined entity by 2027. Historically, the European space industry has been a competent but fragmented market in the form of national champions and competing initiatives. However, Intra-European competition is no longer tenable in the face of strong American and Chinese competitors. Against this backdrop, the merger signals an implicit recognition by European states that scale, specialisation and consolidation have become preconditions for both survival and competitiveness in the global space sector. This could offer a case study for emerging space nations that are struggling to take off.

Europe’s long deliberations till the announcement of the merger have been driven by overarching techno-political pressures. The emergence of SpaceX and its constellation of Starlink satellites have altered the economic calculus of accessing space. This disrupted the complacent status quo that European space companies have become accustomed to. Consequently, the traditional European competence in building and launching large, high-tech and expensive geostationary (GEO) satellites has been undermined by the mass production of smaller and cheaper satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO).

Financial reports highlight the severity of the situation: the space division of Airbus has registered losses of close to USD 700 million last year. Similarly once-thriving Thales Alenia Space has faced a zero-profit year and had to make substantial job cuts. The broader European industry in general has struggled to keep up, with a contraction of its traditional GEO market. Catalysed by these developments, the merger, codenamed Project Bromo and modelled on the MBDA, (a multinational European defence company) aims to arrest the decline of European space prowess by pooling resources, setting aside rivalries and achieving the critical mass needed to win global contracts.

The underlying logic of the merger is deeply interconnected with an emphasis on achieving strategic autonomy. The conflict in Ukraine has highlighted the military utility of space-based assets for communications, imagery and navigation. European governments have thus grown more conscious of the vulnerabilities that stem from the dependence on foreign providers of these vital services. In this context, the new joint venture is the industrial pivot for sovereign European programmes, most notably the IRIS² secure satellite constellation. Hence, the merger intends to ensure that Europe remains in control of its own destiny in space.

Nonetheless, the way forward faces challenges that must be keenly observed. Antitrust approval from the European Commission is a major obstacle, as highlighted by a German space firm, which has expressed concern of a monopolistic landscape after the merger. Analysts also question whether the merger has come too late, assessing that Project Bromo is driven by a Fear of Missing Out (FOMO) on getting a slice of the shrinking pie of the global space economy.

The integration process is also expected to take two to three years; some venture capitalists have hinted that SpaceX may reinvent itself three times in the same time. There is also a legitimate concern that consolidation will undermine the very innovation Europe is trying to promote, leading to a lumbering entity incapable of having the agility of smaller NewSpace companies. Furthermore, negotiations between the three companies on the valuation and the governance have underlined the complexity of uniting different corporate cultures and interests.

For emerging space nations, the dilemma of the European space industry and its response offer an insightful blueprint. Many face similar, if not more acute technopolitical circumstances they are struggling to navigate. The way forward might lie in pragmatic multilateral space cooperation, inspired by the European Space Agency (ESA). For instance, the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation (APSCO) has shown that it is possible to undertake joint projects, like shared data-service platforms. Multilateral space cooperation can empower emerging space faring nations to collectively negotiate globally from a position of strength, which is also a major objective of Project Bromo.

Under such a cooperative framework, specialisation would be a rational strategy considering that even states like France and Germany specialise in certain space technologies. Therefore, emerging space faring nations could try to find niches in which they can build competitive advantages. A state with a strong software industry could specialise in data analytics based on Earth observation imagery, while another, with a favourable geographic position, could specialise in hosting ground station services. A multilateral space bloc might even fund its own small satellite programmes that could be utilised collectively. It would allow the development of specialised expertise and integration of nascent space industries into worldwide supply chains. This approach would be like the one European states are adopting from the amalgamation of their collective strengths.

Drawing from the preceding discussion, it can be argued that the merger of European space giants seems to be catalysed by recent technological and geopolitical undercurrents. So, Project Bromo can be considered a space industry consolidation born out of necessity, but it does shed light on a viable way forward for emerging space nations. The merger underscores how multilateral space cooperation can bolster space autonomy, with specialisation being the key to maintaining relevance in the global space sector. Hence, through cooperation via existing multilateral frameworks and supply chain specialisation, emerging space nations can carve a niche in the global space economy. Scale wins contracts; specialisation wins markets, the challenge would be to combine both without stifling innovation.

Mustafa Bilal is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad. The article was first published in Space News. He can be reached at [email protected]


Share this article

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Recent Publications

Browse through the list of recent publications.

The Cover-up: IAF Narrative of the May 2025 Air Battle

Even after one year since the India-Pakistan May war of 2025, the Indian discourse regarding Operation Sindoor remains uncertain under its pretence of restraint. The Pahalgam attack on 22 April, which killed 26 people, triggered an escalatory spiral. New Delhi quickly accused Pakistan-linked elements, while Islamabad refuted the allegation and demanded an independent investigation. On 7 May, India launched attacks deep inside Pakistan under what it later termed as Operation Sindoor. The political motive was intended to turn the crisis into coercive signalling by shifting the blame onto the enemy and projecting a sense of military superiority.
This episode, however, began to fray immediately as war seldom follows the intended script. Within minutes PAF shot down 7 IAF aircraft including 4 Rafales. On 8 May, Reuters reported that at least two Indian aircraft were shot down by a Pakistani J-10C, while the local government sources reported other aircraft crashes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir

Read More »

Why the IAF’s Post-Sindoor Spending Surge is a Sign of Panic

After Operation Sindoor, India is spending billions of dollars on new weapons. This is being taken by many people as an indication of military prowess. It is not. This rush to procure weapons is in fact an acknowledgement that the Air Force in India had failed to do what it was meant to do. The costly jets and missiles that India had purchased over the years failed to yield the promised results.

Sindoor was soon followed by India in sealing the gaps which the operation had exposed. It was reported that Indian Air Force (IAF) is looking to speed up its purchases of more than 7 billion USD. This will involve other Rafale fighter jets with India already ordering 26 more Rafales to the Navy in 2024 at an estimated cost of about 3.9 billion USD. India is also seeking long-range standoff missiles, Israeli loitering munitions and increased drone capabilities. Special financial powers of the Indian military were activated to issue emergency procurement orders. The magnitude and rate of these purchases speak volumes.

Indian media and defence analysts have over the years considered the Rafale as a game changer. When India purchased 36 Rafales aircrafts at an approximate cost of 8.7 billion USD, analysts vowed that the aircraft would provide India with air superiority over Pakistan. Operation Sindoor disproved all those allegations. Indian aircraft did not even fly in Pakistani airspace when the fighting started. India solely depended on standoff weapons that were launched at a safe distance. The air defence system of Pakistan, comprising of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system and its own fighters, stood its ground.

Read More »

May 2025: Mosaic Warfare and the Myth of Centralised Air Power

Visualise a modern-day Air Force commander sitting in the operations room, miles away from the combat zone, overseeing every friendly and enemy aircraft and all assets involved in the campaign. In a split second, he can task a fighter, reposition a drone, and authorise a strike. In today’s promising technological era, he does not even need an operations room; a laptop on his desktop will suffice. The situation looks promising as it offers efficiency, precision, and control. The term used for such operational control is ‘centralisation’, which has been made possible with advanced networking, integrating space, cyber, surveillance, artificial intelligence, and seamless communication, enabling a single commander to manage an entire campaign from a single node. Centralised command and control, championed by the Western air forces and then adopted by many others, has thus been seen as a pinnacle of modern military power.
The concept of centralisation, enabled by state-of-the-art networking, may seem promising, but it is nothing more than a myth.

Read More »