03. Dua Shahid-Iran-Isr-Leg-Oped thumbnail-July-2025-PUB

On 13 June, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) launched ‘Operation Rising Lion’ against the Islamic Republic of Iran, targeting nuclear facilities, missile sites, military leadership, and nuclear scientists. In the first wave, missile strikes were conducted with 200 aircraft and a number of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to engage over a 100 targets. On the first day alone, IDF’s strikes reportedly killed 78 individuals and injured 329 civilians.

Was this attack lawful under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence and did it comply with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)?

The legal framework governing a state’s use of force includes jus ad bellum and jus ad bello. Jus ad bellum, derived from Article 2 (4) and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), permits the ‘use of force’ and ‘self-defence’ against any state in case of an existential or imminent threat. On the other hand, jus ad bello, known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or LOAC governs the conduct of conflicting parties during an armed conflict.

Israel justified its targeted military operation against Iran based on the pretext of an existential threat posed by the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by Tehran. Initial statements by Israeli officials suggested that Iran had significantly advanced its nuclear programme, with the ‘ability to destroy Israel.’ The operation was, hence, projected as an effort to thwart and eliminate this threat and safeguard Israel’s existence.

A day before Israel struck, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board declared that Iran was in non-compliance of its non-proliferation obligations and had undeclared nuclear material and activities. IAEA did not suggest that Tehran was engaged in making any nuclear weapons or explosive devices. The anticipatory attack would only be legal if there was clear evidence of a nuclear weapon being built, which, in the case of Iran, was missing. This underscores that, in the absence of any nuclear weapon and associated imminent threat of foreseeable attack, Israel’s use of force on the pretext of self-defence violated international law. The applicability of IHL in this case hinges on two key conditions: whether the threshold of de minimis use of force has been crossed and whether a state of de facto hostilities exists.

Israel’s large-scale operation meets the de minimis condition as it crossed the threshold of limited use of force. Also, the exchange of missiles between Israel and Iran in October 2024 indicates a pre-existing conflict, which fulfils the condition of de facto hostilities. Certainly, the applicability of the IHL is established; it must now be examined whether the strikes violated the basic principles of IHL.

Israel claimed that the strikes targeted legitimate military objectives, i.e., Iran’s nuclear facilities. In reality, the strikes did not adhere to the principle of military necessity as the country’s nuclear programme was not used to cause civilian harm. In addition, the expected presence of nuclear fuel at the facilities at the time of the attack could have posed severe risks. The attack thus violated Article 56 of the Additional Protocol (AP I), as the release of ‘dangerous forces’ from the targeted facilities risked radioactive contamination and posed a serious threat to the environment.

IHL’s Article 48 (AP I) requires that the conflicting parties must distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Israel targeted 14 nuclear scientists who were not ‘Directly Participating in Hostilities’ (DPH) and were entitled to protection under the IHL. Several experts at the fourth expert meeting on DPH agreed that neither nuclear weapons specialists nor arms industry employees can be classified as combatants regardless of their contributions to the war. So, in this case, the killing of nuclear scientists by Israel constitutes a further violation of jus ad bello.

It is evident that Israel’s use of force constitutes not only an unlawful act of self-defence but also violates the IHL. Israel does not meet the criterion of anticipatory self-defence since no existential threat was imminent. Similarly, targeting nuclear sites and scientists is a violation of IHL, as they were not legitimate military objectives. Therefore, Israel is complicit of war crimes and must face international legal consequences.

Dua Shahid is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad, Pakistan. The article was first published in The Middle East Monitor. She can be reached at [email protected]


Share this article

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Recent Publications

Browse through the list of recent publications.

The Cover-up: IAF Narrative of the May 2025 Air Battle

Even after one year since the India-Pakistan May war of 2025, the Indian discourse regarding Operation Sindoor remains uncertain under its pretence of restraint. The Pahalgam attack on 22 April, which killed 26 people, triggered an escalatory spiral. New Delhi quickly accused Pakistan-linked elements, while Islamabad refuted the allegation and demanded an independent investigation. On 7 May, India launched attacks deep inside Pakistan under what it later termed as Operation Sindoor. The political motive was intended to turn the crisis into coercive signalling by shifting the blame onto the enemy and projecting a sense of military superiority.
This episode, however, began to fray immediately as war seldom follows the intended script. Within minutes PAF shot down 7 IAF aircraft including 4 Rafales. On 8 May, Reuters reported that at least two Indian aircraft were shot down by a Pakistani J-10C, while the local government sources reported other aircraft crashes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir

Read More »

Why the IAF’s Post-Sindoor Spending Surge is a Sign of Panic

After Operation Sindoor, India is spending billions of dollars on new weapons. This is being taken by many people as an indication of military prowess. It is not. This rush to procure weapons is in fact an acknowledgement that the Air Force in India had failed to do what it was meant to do. The costly jets and missiles that India had purchased over the years failed to yield the promised results.

Sindoor was soon followed by India in sealing the gaps which the operation had exposed. It was reported that Indian Air Force (IAF) is looking to speed up its purchases of more than 7 billion USD. This will involve other Rafale fighter jets with India already ordering 26 more Rafales to the Navy in 2024 at an estimated cost of about 3.9 billion USD. India is also seeking long-range standoff missiles, Israeli loitering munitions and increased drone capabilities. Special financial powers of the Indian military were activated to issue emergency procurement orders. The magnitude and rate of these purchases speak volumes.

Indian media and defence analysts have over the years considered the Rafale as a game changer. When India purchased 36 Rafales aircrafts at an approximate cost of 8.7 billion USD, analysts vowed that the aircraft would provide India with air superiority over Pakistan. Operation Sindoor disproved all those allegations. Indian aircraft did not even fly in Pakistani airspace when the fighting started. India solely depended on standoff weapons that were launched at a safe distance. The air defence system of Pakistan, comprising of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system and its own fighters, stood its ground.

Read More »

May 2025: Mosaic Warfare and the Myth of Centralised Air Power

Visualise a modern-day Air Force commander sitting in the operations room, miles away from the combat zone, overseeing every friendly and enemy aircraft and all assets involved in the campaign. In a split second, he can task a fighter, reposition a drone, and authorise a strike. In today’s promising technological era, he does not even need an operations room; a laptop on his desktop will suffice. The situation looks promising as it offers efficiency, precision, and control. The term used for such operational control is ‘centralisation’, which has been made possible with advanced networking, integrating space, cyber, surveillance, artificial intelligence, and seamless communication, enabling a single commander to manage an entire campaign from a single node. Centralised command and control, championed by the Western air forces and then adopted by many others, has thus been seen as a pinnacle of modern military power.
The concept of centralisation, enabled by state-of-the-art networking, may seem promising, but it is nothing more than a myth.

Read More »