The next General Elections in India are planned in April-May 2024. Going by the past practices, the BJP government is expected to draw domestic political mileage by playing the security card. Pakistan is likely to be the target of Indian diplomatic and media onslaught. India is also expected to venture into a limited military operation to up the ante and incite anti-Pakistan sentiments which can be effectively translated into the BJP’s electoral gains. Recent provocative statements by Indian leaders, notably by the Defence Minister are prelude to such actions. This seminar aimed to discuss the challenges to regional security in the wake of Indian actions in the diplomatic, media and military domains during the run-up to the elections.
The moderator Air Marshal Farooq Habib (Retd), Senior Director at CASS, in his opening address set the stage for the proceedings and highlighted the challenges Pakistan historically faced due to its proximity to India, accentuated by her hegemonic aspirations. He argued that the BJP’s unbridled ambition to win elections has emerged as the most significant factor in India’s relationship with Pakistan as it invariably counts on invoking anti-Pakistan sentiments domestically to gain electoral victory. He cited past incidents, including the Mumbai attack and the Pulwama, as examples where such strategies provoked anti-Pakistan feelings benefitting incumbent Indian governments. He also commented on recent belligerent remarks from Indian leaders and warned of potential escalatory measures in diplomatic, media and military spheres. While stressing the need for timely response he argued that Pakistan’s response must be reflective of the past experiences, current realities and future contingencies.
Speaking on ‘Indian Electoral Politics: Implications for Diplomacy and Options for Pakistan’, Ambassador Ashraf Jehangir Qazi discussed Prime Minister Modi’s anticipated approach towards the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, while agreeing that he would certainly leverage the security narrative against Pakistan. Ambassador Qazi noted past instances where Pakistan was blamed for attacks in Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (IIOJ&K) region, predicting that such tactics were likely to be amplified in the run-up to the elections. He further predicted attempts by India to exploit internal issues in regions like Gilgit-Baltistan. Reflecting on global reactions, he highlighted the lack of support from the Western political and security community for Pakistan, particularly post-Pulwama, Balakot, and the annexation of IIOJ&K, attributing it to India’s burgeoning reputation as an ascending global power. Delineating Pakistan’s strategic options, Ambassador Qazi argued that proactive diplomacy alone would not be sufficient to counter Indian escalations. He contended that international apathy to India’s alleged exploitation of the security narrative for electoral mileage would persist unless Pakistan focused on internal governance reforms.
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The Cover-up: IAF Narrative of the May 2025 Air Battle
Even after one year since the India-Pakistan May war of 2025, the Indian discourse regarding Operation Sindoor remains uncertain under its pretence of restraint. The Pahalgam attack on 22 April, which killed 26 people, triggered an escalatory spiral. New Delhi quickly accused Pakistan-linked elements, while Islamabad refuted the allegation and demanded an independent investigation. On 7 May, India launched attacks deep inside Pakistan under what it later termed as Operation Sindoor. The political motive was intended to turn the crisis into coercive signalling by shifting the blame onto the enemy and projecting a sense of military superiority.
This episode, however, began to fray immediately as war seldom follows the intended script. Within minutes PAF shot down 7 IAF aircraft including 4 Rafales. On 8 May, Reuters reported that at least two Indian aircraft were shot down by a Pakistani J-10C, while the local government sources reported other aircraft crashes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir
Why the IAF’s Post-Sindoor Spending Surge is a Sign of Panic
After Operation Sindoor, India is spending billions of dollars on new weapons. This is being taken by many people as an indication of military prowess. It is not. This rush to procure weapons is in fact an acknowledgement that the Air Force in India had failed to do what it was meant to do. The costly jets and missiles that India had purchased over the years failed to yield the promised results.
Sindoor was soon followed by India in sealing the gaps which the operation had exposed. It was reported that Indian Air Force (IAF) is looking to speed up its purchases of more than 7 billion USD. This will involve other Rafale fighter jets with India already ordering 26 more Rafales to the Navy in 2024 at an estimated cost of about 3.9 billion USD. India is also seeking long-range standoff missiles, Israeli loitering munitions and increased drone capabilities. Special financial powers of the Indian military were activated to issue emergency procurement orders. The magnitude and rate of these purchases speak volumes.
Indian media and defence analysts have over the years considered the Rafale as a game changer. When India purchased 36 Rafales aircrafts at an approximate cost of 8.7 billion USD, analysts vowed that the aircraft would provide India with air superiority over Pakistan. Operation Sindoor disproved all those allegations. Indian aircraft did not even fly in Pakistani airspace when the fighting started. India solely depended on standoff weapons that were launched at a safe distance. The air defence system of Pakistan, comprising of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system and its own fighters, stood its ground.
May 2025: Mosaic Warfare and the Myth of Centralised Air Power
Visualise a modern-day Air Force commander sitting in the operations room, miles away from the combat zone, overseeing every friendly and enemy aircraft and all assets involved in the campaign. In a split second, he can task a fighter, reposition a drone, and authorise a strike. In today’s promising technological era, he does not even need an operations room; a laptop on his desktop will suffice. The situation looks promising as it offers efficiency, precision, and control. The term used for such operational control is ‘centralisation’, which has been made possible with advanced networking, integrating space, cyber, surveillance, artificial intelligence, and seamless communication, enabling a single commander to manage an entire campaign from a single node. Centralised command and control, championed by the Western air forces and then adopted by many others, has thus been seen as a pinnacle of modern military power.
The concept of centralisation, enabled by state-of-the-art networking, may seem promising, but it is nothing more than a myth.
