Ajwa Hijazi-Taliban-20 Dec 2023

Hassan Abbas, The Return of the Taliban: Afghanistan after the Americans Left (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2023)

Reviewed by Ajwa Hijazi

Hassan Abbas’s book The Return of the Taliban: Afghanistan after the Americans Left elucidates what followed after the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021, in Afghanistan. The author guides the reader through an exploration of the Taliban’s challenges and prospects upon assuming power in Afghanistan.

The book is divided into six chapters, each revolving around Afghanistan’s present leadership: the Afghan Taliban. The first chapter highlights the pivotal factors leading to the Taliban’s negotiations with the United States (US), which paved the way for their eventual arrival in Kabul. The second chapter explains the formation of the Taliban’s interim government and their governance dynamics. The third underscores the range of the challenges faced by the Taliban amidst internal divisions in their ranks. The fourth chapter elaborates on their religious roots and its relevancy in the contemporary Muslim world. In the fifth chapter, the author discusses the intricate relationship between the Taliban and its ally, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as their hostility towards the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISK). The sixth and final chapter examines the nuanced dynamics of the Taliban’s international relations, highlighting the strategic responses of various nations to their interim government and the pursuit of global recognition.

Abbas opines that the Taliban successfully pursued their core objective during the negotiation process which was the complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan (p. 51). All this while, the Taliban continued to advance in Afghanistan by capturing strategically important areas (pp. 11-12). However, once they attained power, they faced the challenge of transformation from an insurgent group to a functioning government. The author comprehensively outlines their challenges, including internal divisions, policies on women and minorities, financial woes, ISK, etc. He argues that initially, the Taliban appeared to concentrate on improving their global image by setting aside their former stringent policies (p. 85). However, their inherent tendency towards non-inclusivity soon surfaced, notably in their failure to uphold promises of protecting women’s rights. Furthermore, the author probes into the Taliban’s religious foundations, illustrating how their quest to establish a religious state involves merging Afghan nationalism with what he calls, their version of ‘extreme religious nationalism’. (p. 159).

The book also traces the Taliban’s historical closeness with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and their present leanings towards the group, elucidating the intricate relationship dynamics between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Regarding the Taliban’s international relations, the author contends that their pursuit of global recognition is driven by political, social, and psychological necessities. The Taliban understand that without formal international legitimacy, they struggle to achieve domestic credibility or ensure a seamless governance pathway (p. 211). He concludes that the Taliban must prioritise internal unity. Historically, their cohesion has been rooted in anti-Western sentiments. To collaborate with the very ‘West’ for legitimacy, they need to fundamentally reconsider and internalise their worldview (pp. 237-238). Furthermore, Abbas stresses the importance of engaging with the Taliban, arguing that the world should move beyond the outdated image of Mullah Omar as the face of the Taliban. There’s a need to acknowledge the new reality, where a younger, more moderate generation of the Taliban is likely to significantly influence the policy decisions of the older generation (pp. 150-152).

The author draws on his connections in security and diplomatic circles, including officials from the former Afghan government, using interviews to support his arguments. However, as noted at the end of the third chapter, there are instances where the information from these various sources seems contradictory. Moreover, as Arnold Zeitlin points out, the book largely omits the US’ role in extending the Afghan war over nearly two decades. Zeitlin also observes that the author adopts a rather lenient tone towards Zalmay Khalilzad, the key figure in the US negotiations with the Taliban. On the other hand, he seems to be more abrasive while talking about Pakistan’s role in the Afghanistan situation. For instance, through various nuances, it has been implied that Pakistan ‘aided and abetted’ the insurgency by the Taliban in Afghanistan (p. 244).

This is one of the first comprehensive accounts of the resurgent Taliban government in Afghanistan and aims to differentiate between the ‘old Taliban’ and the ‘new Taliban’. It presents a nuanced and well-researched exploration of the contemporary Taliban’s mindset, demographic composition, leadership, and organisational dynamics. The book offers a critical perspective on the Taliban’s ascendancy to the Presidential Palace in Kabul and their current governance strategies, contrasting significantly with their experience in the 1990s. Whether one agrees with the author’s views on a Taliban-led Afghanistan or not, this work provides valuable insights into the historical and current contexts of the Taliban’s rule.

Ajwa Hijazi is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad, Pakistan. She can be reached at [email protected].


Share this article

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Recent Publications

Browse through the list of recent publications.

The Cover-up: IAF Narrative of the May 2025 Air Battle

Even after one year since the India-Pakistan May war of 2025, the Indian discourse regarding Operation Sindoor remains uncertain under its pretence of restraint. The Pahalgam attack on 22 April, which killed 26 people, triggered an escalatory spiral. New Delhi quickly accused Pakistan-linked elements, while Islamabad refuted the allegation and demanded an independent investigation. On 7 May, India launched attacks deep inside Pakistan under what it later termed as Operation Sindoor. The political motive was intended to turn the crisis into coercive signalling by shifting the blame onto the enemy and projecting a sense of military superiority.
This episode, however, began to fray immediately as war seldom follows the intended script. Within minutes PAF shot down 7 IAF aircraft including 4 Rafales. On 8 May, Reuters reported that at least two Indian aircraft were shot down by a Pakistani J-10C, while the local government sources reported other aircraft crashes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir

Read More »

Why the IAF’s Post-Sindoor Spending Surge is a Sign of Panic

After Operation Sindoor, India is spending billions of dollars on new weapons. This is being taken by many people as an indication of military prowess. It is not. This rush to procure weapons is in fact an acknowledgement that the Air Force in India had failed to do what it was meant to do. The costly jets and missiles that India had purchased over the years failed to yield the promised results.

Sindoor was soon followed by India in sealing the gaps which the operation had exposed. It was reported that Indian Air Force (IAF) is looking to speed up its purchases of more than 7 billion USD. This will involve other Rafale fighter jets with India already ordering 26 more Rafales to the Navy in 2024 at an estimated cost of about 3.9 billion USD. India is also seeking long-range standoff missiles, Israeli loitering munitions and increased drone capabilities. Special financial powers of the Indian military were activated to issue emergency procurement orders. The magnitude and rate of these purchases speak volumes.

Indian media and defence analysts have over the years considered the Rafale as a game changer. When India purchased 36 Rafales aircrafts at an approximate cost of 8.7 billion USD, analysts vowed that the aircraft would provide India with air superiority over Pakistan. Operation Sindoor disproved all those allegations. Indian aircraft did not even fly in Pakistani airspace when the fighting started. India solely depended on standoff weapons that were launched at a safe distance. The air defence system of Pakistan, comprising of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system and its own fighters, stood its ground.

Read More »

May 2025: Mosaic Warfare and the Myth of Centralised Air Power

Visualise a modern-day Air Force commander sitting in the operations room, miles away from the combat zone, overseeing every friendly and enemy aircraft and all assets involved in the campaign. In a split second, he can task a fighter, reposition a drone, and authorise a strike. In today’s promising technological era, he does not even need an operations room; a laptop on his desktop will suffice. The situation looks promising as it offers efficiency, precision, and control. The term used for such operational control is ‘centralisation’, which has been made possible with advanced networking, integrating space, cyber, surveillance, artificial intelligence, and seamless communication, enabling a single commander to manage an entire campaign from a single node. Centralised command and control, championed by the Western air forces and then adopted by many others, has thus been seen as a pinnacle of modern military power.
The concept of centralisation, enabled by state-of-the-art networking, may seem promising, but it is nothing more than a myth.

Read More »