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The recent attack in Lebanon involving a ‘Pager’ and ‘Walkie Talkie’ as a delivery mechanism for an explosive device has sent shockwaves across the globe. This incident brings into sharper focus a worrisome new twist to technological warfare and also makes one think about the integrity of such modest electronic gadgets. As geopolitics intertwines with the race for technological supremacy; this article examines the potential threats posed by these seemingly harmless gadgets, their vulnerabilities, and the broader implications on global security and self-reliance.

The attack in Lebanon shows that even though gadgets like pagers and walkie talkies are basic, they can be weaponised through different techniques. Recent advances in explosive miniaturisation have enabled the creation of devices as small as 50 grams, compact enough to resemble everyday items like a pager, yet capable of causing significant harm. Moreover, the pager’s electronics, particularly a ‘battery’, can also be activated or exploded with different methods such as an automatic timer, a remote control or a facial recognition system.

From a geopolitical perspective, weaponising electronic devices such as pagers and walkie-talkies has a major implication on supply chain security. In the event that some of the components or devices within the production line get exploited, the likelihood of exploitation is possible. According to a World Economic Forum’s report, 30% of electronics manufacturers have endured some form of interference or tampering with their product supply chain, which can cause a threat to cybersecurity or physical risk. As China and the United States (US) continue to battle for supremacy in the hi-tech manufacturing sector, many developing countries find themselves at the receiving end, mainly as customers of strategic technologies or components. Thus, ‘self-reliance’ has turned into one of the defining strategic goals for any country.

Consumer gadgets, such as pagers, have also been repurposed as weapons in the realm of 5th Generation Warfare (5GW). Unlike traditional kinetic warfare, 5GW leverages new technologies and information warfare to achieve strategic objectives without direct armed conflict. This evolving battlefield extends beyond altered communication devices and cyber-attacks, as it now includes the ability of cyber attackers to transform seemingly harmless gadgets into lethal weapons. It is estimated that more than 43% of small and medium electronic devices are currently connected to the Internet; therefore, can be easily hacked. Compounding this situation, there has been a development of sophisticated Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning which has made it easier for hackers to take advantage of software loopholes in regular-use gadgets and transform them into mini bombs or spying machines.

These recent explosions of gadgets highlight global challenges linked to technological dominance notably by the West and US maintaining a large lead in emerging technologies fostering dependency in developing countries. This dependency disrupts local economies and limits technological growth and innovation. Additionally, the covert use of consumer technologies, such as pagers, highlights the risks of these dependencies, as they can be exploited for espionage or military purposes, creating further security concerns for vulnerable nations. After this incident, the use of consumer goods as weapons would become an increasingly serious worldwide issue, especially when everyday technologies such as smartphones or smart devices can be repurposed for surveillance, espionage, or cyberattacks. This dilemma also puts pressure on global supply chains, as countries become wary of importing technology that could be used for malicious purposes. This highlights the need for a shift towards self-reliance in technological innovations, to avoid the recurrence of similar nature in any country.

As a way forward, Pakistan ought to secure its global supply chain sources to prevent consumer goods from being weaponised. Secondly, technological sources need to be diversified to avoid single-point dependency. Lastly and most importantly as a long-term solution, Pakistan must increase its investment in Research and Development (R&D) for emerging technologies and enhance local manufacturing to reduce reliance on global supply chains and achieve technological sovereignty. This approach will help mitigate risks associated with external dependencies and strengthen the nation’s innovation ecosystem. In this way, the country can protect its domestic production lines and technological structure from infiltration and compromise.

In today’s world, impact of the chip war and 5GW on global politics has made technological sovereignty more crucial than ever. The ‘war of gadgets’ is no longer a futuristic concept but a present-day reality capable of threatening global peace. This is clearly seen in cases like Lebanon, where the next form of warfare did not take place on land, sea, or air, but within pockets and homes.

Keywords: Technological Warfare, Self-reliance, 5th Gen Warfare, Technological Sovereignty

 

Air Commodore Raza Haider (Retd) is currently serving as Director at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad, Pakistan. He can be contacted at: [email protected].


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