economic crisis of pakistan

The past year has clearly been challenging for Pakistan from an economic point of view, defying initial expectations. As the COVID-19 pandemic appeared to be slowing down, there was optimism that the year 2022 would be characterised by the country’s recovery from COVID-induced shocks. According to the World Bank’s ‘Global Economic Prospects Report, 2022,’ Pakistan’s economy was expected to grow by 3.4 percent in the fiscal year 2021-2022 and 4 percent in the fiscal year 2022-2023. The report also revised and increased the growth projections for the overall South Asian region since June 2021 owing to ‘better prospects in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh.’

However, the expectations did not stand the test of time. By the end of the year, Pakistan’s economy appeared to be teetering on the verge of a crisis. This manifested in the form of excessive inflation, business and industry closures, unemployment, a massive decline in central bank reserves, a substantial reduction in exports and remittances, and a historic depreciation of the Pakistani Rupee. Revised projections now estimate the country’s economy to grow by just 2 percent in the fiscal year 2022-2023, which can be attributed to a number of internal and external factors.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict beginning in early 2022 led to the largest commodity price shock after the 1973 oil crisis, giving an unwelcome blow to countries across the world. Pakistan’s fate was particularly hard due to the country’s heavy reliance on imported fuel and limited fiscal resources. As if this wasn’t enough, the country was soon overwhelmed with its worst flooding catastrophe in decades, washing away crops, roads, livestock, and infrastructure and inflicting aggregate economic damage of USD 30 billion.

Furthermore, the inflationary shock of 2022 translated into a global interest rate hiking spree that was led by the US Federal Reserve. This led to the depreciation of a number of developing countries’ currencies against the major currencies, which worsened their debt problems and prompted their central banks to increase domestic interest rates. Pakistan was no exception. By the end of 2022, Pakistan’s interest rate hike, which began in April, amounted to 6.25 percentage points, increasing the cost of financing investments and reducing the demand for goods and services. 

To top it all off, the year witnessed one of the worst domestic political crises. In April, the sitting Prime Minister was ousted from power resulting in large number of people taking to the streets. The political chaos further intensified following his attempted assassination in early November. Some also tend to argue that the incumbent government’s poor management of the economy compounded Pakistan’s economic turmoil. Moreover, the year witnessed a surge in militant acts in the country, further threatening economic stability. Given these factors, the trajectory of the economic situation continued spiralling throughout the year.

As we step into 2023, a big question is whether the economy can experience a rebound during the year. Arguably, a dramatic rebound is unlikely, at least in the near future. Global commodity prices are expected to remain elevated in 2023, despite recording a slight decline, and interest rates are anticipated to continue rising. Likewise, the domestic political crisis does not appear to abate, at least in the first few months, and one can only hope that the security situation will improve.

The above must not convey the impression that the present economic circumstances are only driven by exogenous factors or unmanageable internal ones, but any negligence now can have dire consequences as Pakistan today stands at a critical juncture.

The policy leaders must understand that recurrent tweaks and manipulations will not work. What Pakistan requires right now is policy stability guided by a set of urgently developed short- and medium-term strategies outlining coherent and realistic goals to reverse the economic slowdown. All political entities – federal and provincial – need to think beyond their political stakes to develop a national strategy while also considering the inputs from experts in relevant fields, the private sector, and the business community to ensure that policy implementation enjoys viable support.

Acquiring the general public’s support to implement some drastic measures will also be critical, necessitating the development of a communication unit dedicated to communicating the constantly changing economic outlook to all sectors through easily accessible channels to help them comprehend the enormity of the economic crisis. All stakeholders, including the public, must realize that some measures would be painful but necessary to ward off a full-blown financial crisis. However, this is only possible for as long as it is not just the common man who has to bear the brunt of those ‘painful measures.’

The way ahead for Pakistan is undoubtedly challenging, but it is through determined efforts that one can expect the country’s economic prospects to soften gradually, if not immediately.

Zahra Niazi is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad, Pakistan. She can be reached at [email protected].


Share this article

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Recent Publications

Browse through the list of recent publications.

The Cover-up: IAF Narrative of the May 2025 Air Battle

Even after one year since the India-Pakistan May war of 2025, the Indian discourse regarding Operation Sindoor remains uncertain under its pretence of restraint. The Pahalgam attack on 22 April, which killed 26 people, triggered an escalatory spiral. New Delhi quickly accused Pakistan-linked elements, while Islamabad refuted the allegation and demanded an independent investigation. On 7 May, India launched attacks deep inside Pakistan under what it later termed as Operation Sindoor. The political motive was intended to turn the crisis into coercive signalling by shifting the blame onto the enemy and projecting a sense of military superiority.
This episode, however, began to fray immediately as war seldom follows the intended script. Within minutes PAF shot down 7 IAF aircraft including 4 Rafales. On 8 May, Reuters reported that at least two Indian aircraft were shot down by a Pakistani J-10C, while the local government sources reported other aircraft crashes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir

Read More »

Why the IAF’s Post-Sindoor Spending Surge is a Sign of Panic

After Operation Sindoor, India is spending billions of dollars on new weapons. This is being taken by many people as an indication of military prowess. It is not. This rush to procure weapons is in fact an acknowledgement that the Air Force in India had failed to do what it was meant to do. The costly jets and missiles that India had purchased over the years failed to yield the promised results.

Sindoor was soon followed by India in sealing the gaps which the operation had exposed. It was reported that Indian Air Force (IAF) is looking to speed up its purchases of more than 7 billion USD. This will involve other Rafale fighter jets with India already ordering 26 more Rafales to the Navy in 2024 at an estimated cost of about 3.9 billion USD. India is also seeking long-range standoff missiles, Israeli loitering munitions and increased drone capabilities. Special financial powers of the Indian military were activated to issue emergency procurement orders. The magnitude and rate of these purchases speak volumes.

Indian media and defence analysts have over the years considered the Rafale as a game changer. When India purchased 36 Rafales aircrafts at an approximate cost of 8.7 billion USD, analysts vowed that the aircraft would provide India with air superiority over Pakistan. Operation Sindoor disproved all those allegations. Indian aircraft did not even fly in Pakistani airspace when the fighting started. India solely depended on standoff weapons that were launched at a safe distance. The air defence system of Pakistan, comprising of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system and its own fighters, stood its ground.

Read More »

May 2025: Mosaic Warfare and the Myth of Centralised Air Power

Visualise a modern-day Air Force commander sitting in the operations room, miles away from the combat zone, overseeing every friendly and enemy aircraft and all assets involved in the campaign. In a split second, he can task a fighter, reposition a drone, and authorise a strike. In today’s promising technological era, he does not even need an operations room; a laptop on his desktop will suffice. The situation looks promising as it offers efficiency, precision, and control. The term used for such operational control is ‘centralisation’, which has been made possible with advanced networking, integrating space, cyber, surveillance, artificial intelligence, and seamless communication, enabling a single commander to manage an entire campaign from a single node. Centralised command and control, championed by the Western air forces and then adopted by many others, has thus been seen as a pinnacle of modern military power.
The concept of centralisation, enabled by state-of-the-art networking, may seem promising, but it is nothing more than a myth.

Read More »