Sober FATF

The scope of money laundering is tiny in Pakistan compared to that of its eastern neighbor, but India’s dirty money is also dwarfed by the amount of illicit funding that passes through many mainstream banks of the Western world. The fairly recent Russian Laundromat scheme of funnelling wealth from former Soviet nations shows just how Deutsche Bank, supposedly the most pristine financial institution and the largest one in Germany, was complicit in funneling a riot of black money into the developed world. But the FATF has been imbalanced in its targeting of jurisdictions since 9/11, with a disproportionate focus on the countries that the US sought to pressurize in the Middle East and South Asia, even though Russia is the second-largest source of black money flows (at least $100 billion per year since 2013, according to GFI), and many Eastern European countries are prime sources for siphoning illegal wealth. This also has very much to do with how the definition of “terrorist” has changed in the Western psyche since 9/11.

However, the worst offenders of money laundering in the world, as defined by transacting jurisdictions, are hiding in plain sight of the holier-than-thou Western capitals: Jersey, Guernsey, Delaware, Miami, Frankfurt, the US Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, and of course, London. Many of these locations also act as tax havens, and are the biggest players in the game. If the FATF were serious about money laundering, it would seal these places shut, because they ooze with financial corruption on a monumental scale. The Panama Papers, FinCEN Leaks, and countless other revelations give us just a fleeting glimpse of how bad global money laundering is, and Pakistan is nothing but a minor footnote, if ever mentioned at all, on those revelatory lists.

The Pakistani public, its politicians, and its technical experts have all now converged on the point that the FATF is really at fault. It harps on like a broken record by asking incessantly for Pakistan to “do more.” In the process, the FATF has compromised its own legitimacy. Although it does considerable damage, it hasn’t managed to forestall the Pakistani economy, which is composed of largely young people trudging along against the odds. Pakistan’s steps to improve its AML/CFT protocols and praxis should not be seen as a means to satisfying an external body like the FATF: they should be seen as a means of making Pakistan’s financial system more open, transparent and effective; thus doing justice to a young population that is beginning to come of age.

In other words, combating money laundering and stopping terrorist financing are good things in and of themselves, and should not be done to appease anyone abroad but rather to strengthen Pakistan itself.

But the rebuke that the FATF has increasingly received in Pakistan is justified: anti-money laundering activities in modern global capitalism cannot and will not be addressed by punishing Pakistan. Indeed, perhaps no international body has been as bad at doing its job as the FATF: money-laundering and the illicit flows of funds are higher than ever and rising by the day, particularly as newer technologies (cryptocurrencies, ransomware, etc.) make it even more elusive a task.

It is estimated by the firm Market Research Reports (MRR) that global money laundering will exhibit a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 15% for each year in the period 2019-2027, which is an astounding rate of growth for any economic activity, let alone that of an illegal sort. How will the FATF face this challenge when it has been captured for political motives?

The writer is the Director for Economics and National Affairs at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS). He can be reached at [email protected].


Share this article

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Recent Publications

Browse through the list of recent publications.

The Cover-up: IAF Narrative of the May 2025 Air Battle

Even after one year since the India-Pakistan May war of 2025, the Indian discourse regarding Operation Sindoor remains uncertain under its pretence of restraint. The Pahalgam attack on 22 April, which killed 26 people, triggered an escalatory spiral. New Delhi quickly accused Pakistan-linked elements, while Islamabad refuted the allegation and demanded an independent investigation. On 7 May, India launched attacks deep inside Pakistan under what it later termed as Operation Sindoor. The political motive was intended to turn the crisis into coercive signalling by shifting the blame onto the enemy and projecting a sense of military superiority.
This episode, however, began to fray immediately as war seldom follows the intended script. Within minutes PAF shot down 7 IAF aircraft including 4 Rafales. On 8 May, Reuters reported that at least two Indian aircraft were shot down by a Pakistani J-10C, while the local government sources reported other aircraft crashes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir

Read More »

Why the IAF’s Post-Sindoor Spending Surge is a Sign of Panic

After Operation Sindoor, India is spending billions of dollars on new weapons. This is being taken by many people as an indication of military prowess. It is not. This rush to procure weapons is in fact an acknowledgement that the Air Force in India had failed to do what it was meant to do. The costly jets and missiles that India had purchased over the years failed to yield the promised results.

Sindoor was soon followed by India in sealing the gaps which the operation had exposed. It was reported that Indian Air Force (IAF) is looking to speed up its purchases of more than 7 billion USD. This will involve other Rafale fighter jets with India already ordering 26 more Rafales to the Navy in 2024 at an estimated cost of about 3.9 billion USD. India is also seeking long-range standoff missiles, Israeli loitering munitions and increased drone capabilities. Special financial powers of the Indian military were activated to issue emergency procurement orders. The magnitude and rate of these purchases speak volumes.

Indian media and defence analysts have over the years considered the Rafale as a game changer. When India purchased 36 Rafales aircrafts at an approximate cost of 8.7 billion USD, analysts vowed that the aircraft would provide India with air superiority over Pakistan. Operation Sindoor disproved all those allegations. Indian aircraft did not even fly in Pakistani airspace when the fighting started. India solely depended on standoff weapons that were launched at a safe distance. The air defence system of Pakistan, comprising of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system and its own fighters, stood its ground.

Read More »

May 2025: Mosaic Warfare and the Myth of Centralised Air Power

Visualise a modern-day Air Force commander sitting in the operations room, miles away from the combat zone, overseeing every friendly and enemy aircraft and all assets involved in the campaign. In a split second, he can task a fighter, reposition a drone, and authorise a strike. In today’s promising technological era, he does not even need an operations room; a laptop on his desktop will suffice. The situation looks promising as it offers efficiency, precision, and control. The term used for such operational control is ‘centralisation’, which has been made possible with advanced networking, integrating space, cyber, surveillance, artificial intelligence, and seamless communication, enabling a single commander to manage an entire campaign from a single node. Centralised command and control, championed by the Western air forces and then adopted by many others, has thus been seen as a pinnacle of modern military power.
The concept of centralisation, enabled by state-of-the-art networking, may seem promising, but it is nothing more than a myth.

Read More »