Afghan Withdarwal

The White House on April 6th issued a summary of the review of US’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. This 12-page document encapsulates the major decisions taken by the US administration when it was pulling out forces from Afghanistan in 2021.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee, headed by Republican Michael McCaul, is conducting hearings to look into the way in which the Biden Administration departed from Afghanistan. The Committee demanded to see a review of the decisions leading to the withdrawal prepared by the Pentagon and State Department which were sent privately to Congress. While the original documents remain classified, the summary of conclusions, prepared by the National Security Council with President Biden’s direct input has been made public by the US government. It explicitly states that due to the Trump administration’s lack of planning, President Biden was faced with ‘severely constrained’ options to end the war in Afghanistan.

The summary states that a series of President Trump’s decisions strengthened the Taliban. Initiation of talks with the Taliban without consulting allies; the non-inclusive process of negotiations by keeping the Afghan government out of the process; pressurising the Afghan government to release Taliban commanders as a part of the Doha Agreement without securing the release of a US hostage; and finally the drawdown of US troops impacted the US position on the ground. Subsequently, when Biden took charge in January 2021 with the looming date of withdrawal of May 2021, Afghan Taliban were in control of nearly half of the country with 2500 US forces personnel on the ground. According to the document, there was no ‘transition coordination’ between the outgoing and incoming governments as the former had no concrete plan for final withdrawal.

Furthermore, the review also highlights faulty optimistic intelligence assessments about the fighting prowess of the Afghan forces and the likelihood of the capital, Kabul not falling quickly to the Taliban. According to the review, the unrealistic ground assessments led to the process of evacuation starting quite late. The US carried out its largest non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) and evacuated 124,333 American and Afghans in 17 days, but it occurred when things were on the brink of getting out of control. The visuals of people running along the C-17 transport plane of the US Air Force as it was taking off from the Kabul airport aptly depicted the high degree of chaos with which the US wrapped up one of its longest wars. While the White House document does not accept responsibility for delayed evacuations, it has been prioritising early evacuations of Americans amid any overseas security crisis since then.

The release of this summary of the internal assessments has triggered a political feud between Republicans and Democrats as the former is accusing the White House of distracting the public from the deadly withdrawal from Afghanistan which killed 170 Afghans, along with 13 American troops in a suicide bombing at Kabul airport, followed by a miscalculated drone strike which killed 10 civilians, including 7 children. Moreover, Donald Trump also responded to these summary conclusions by stating that the Biden Administration was blaming him for its ‘grossly incompetent surrender’ in Afghanistan.

Apart from triggering a political blame game between the previous and current administrations, this review mainly reflects the same lack of foresight and clarity in the US policy towards Afghanistan, at the time of withdrawal, which was a hallmark of its 20 years of war. Underestimation of the Afghan Taliban’s power and overestimation of Ghani’s government efficiency led to US authorities not being able to foresee the win of the Afghan Taliban from city to city before reaching Kabul on 15 August 2021. The US position, in the face of the Taliban’s rapid action, was weakened to an extent where, according to General Mark Milley (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff), no amount of time, funds and presence of forces could alter the result of the war which ended with the Taliban being stronger than ever.

In the future, there may be additional declassification of confidential documents regarding the US policy response during the Afghanistan withdrawal. However, the onus of responsibility for the chaotic events of the summer of 2021 ultimately falls on both the Trump and Biden administrations. The process of leaving Afghanistan could have been smooth and less lethal if a well-coordinated policy (in light of changing ground realities) had been formulated through deliberations between the US, the Afghan government, and the Taliban. Ultimately, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan was just as hasty as its entry some 20 years ago.

Ajwa Hijazi is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad, Pakistan. She can be reached at [email protected].


Share this article

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Recent Publications

Browse through the list of recent publications.

The Cover-up: IAF Narrative of the May 2025 Air Battle

Even after one year since the India-Pakistan May war of 2025, the Indian discourse regarding Operation Sindoor remains uncertain under its pretence of restraint. The Pahalgam attack on 22 April, which killed 26 people, triggered an escalatory spiral. New Delhi quickly accused Pakistan-linked elements, while Islamabad refuted the allegation and demanded an independent investigation. On 7 May, India launched attacks deep inside Pakistan under what it later termed as Operation Sindoor. The political motive was intended to turn the crisis into coercive signalling by shifting the blame onto the enemy and projecting a sense of military superiority.
This episode, however, began to fray immediately as war seldom follows the intended script. Within minutes PAF shot down 7 IAF aircraft including 4 Rafales. On 8 May, Reuters reported that at least two Indian aircraft were shot down by a Pakistani J-10C, while the local government sources reported other aircraft crashes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir

Read More »

Why the IAF’s Post-Sindoor Spending Surge is a Sign of Panic

After Operation Sindoor, India is spending billions of dollars on new weapons. This is being taken by many people as an indication of military prowess. It is not. This rush to procure weapons is in fact an acknowledgement that the Air Force in India had failed to do what it was meant to do. The costly jets and missiles that India had purchased over the years failed to yield the promised results.

Sindoor was soon followed by India in sealing the gaps which the operation had exposed. It was reported that Indian Air Force (IAF) is looking to speed up its purchases of more than 7 billion USD. This will involve other Rafale fighter jets with India already ordering 26 more Rafales to the Navy in 2024 at an estimated cost of about 3.9 billion USD. India is also seeking long-range standoff missiles, Israeli loitering munitions and increased drone capabilities. Special financial powers of the Indian military were activated to issue emergency procurement orders. The magnitude and rate of these purchases speak volumes.

Indian media and defence analysts have over the years considered the Rafale as a game changer. When India purchased 36 Rafales aircrafts at an approximate cost of 8.7 billion USD, analysts vowed that the aircraft would provide India with air superiority over Pakistan. Operation Sindoor disproved all those allegations. Indian aircraft did not even fly in Pakistani airspace when the fighting started. India solely depended on standoff weapons that were launched at a safe distance. The air defence system of Pakistan, comprising of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system and its own fighters, stood its ground.

Read More »

May 2025: Mosaic Warfare and the Myth of Centralised Air Power

Visualise a modern-day Air Force commander sitting in the operations room, miles away from the combat zone, overseeing every friendly and enemy aircraft and all assets involved in the campaign. In a split second, he can task a fighter, reposition a drone, and authorise a strike. In today’s promising technological era, he does not even need an operations room; a laptop on his desktop will suffice. The situation looks promising as it offers efficiency, precision, and control. The term used for such operational control is ‘centralisation’, which has been made possible with advanced networking, integrating space, cyber, surveillance, artificial intelligence, and seamless communication, enabling a single commander to manage an entire campaign from a single node. Centralised command and control, championed by the Western air forces and then adopted by many others, has thus been seen as a pinnacle of modern military power.
The concept of centralisation, enabled by state-of-the-art networking, may seem promising, but it is nothing more than a myth.

Read More »