Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: Innovation and Vulnerability in the Digital Economy

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: Innovation and Vulnerability in the Digital Economy

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: Innovation and Vulnerability in the Digital Economy, First Edition, Routledge (2024)
Edited by Sven Van Kerckhoven & Dr Usman W. Chohan

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) constitute a comparatively novel area in academic research and scholarship, but the budding interest in this category of digital and algorithmic organization across various disciplines provides an indication of the possibilities that DAOs wield in terms of informing and advancing our understanding of the potentialities of the digital economy’s forthcoming iterations. It also points towards practical use cases to solve problems that the increasing decentralisation and amorphisation of the structures of the digital economy portend. At the same time, DAOs are afflicted by various strands of skepticism that are attributable to their vulnerabilities, subjacent hype, ultimate purpose, and usefulness. This skepticism also requires scholarly attention and careful study through multidisciplinary perspectives, as further research may come to either dispel or confirm the array of concerns that continue to loom large about DAOs as technological, governance, societal, and economic instruments in the future.

With all this in mind, the aim of this book is to offer multiple studied perspectives that explore DAOs from a variety of perspectives across several disciplinary prisms. It does not seek simply to weigh the balance of DAO’s merits and demerits, but rather to conceive, appreciate, and discover various elements of ultimate import to DAOs over their future evolutionary course. Drawing upon the insights of interdisciplinary subject matter experts, this book allows for a holistic enquiry into the role, potential and limitations of DAOs. The book will thus be of interest to a multidisciplinary audience of scholars in organisational studies, computer science, economics, sociology of technology, philosophy, law, and the governance of innovation.

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