Pakistan’s Madrassah Conundrum-MDS

The madrassah sector in Pakistan constitutes a large segment of students seeking religious education. These madrassahs are often regarded as pursuing specific political and ideological agendas. Religious seminaries, especially unregistered and unregulated, usually enroll students from low-income, rural backgrounds where parents do not have resources or intent to educate them at public or private schools and colleges. Unfortunately, while madrassahs are not the only recruitment grounds for religious militancy and sectarian violence, they have also contributed to leadership of several banned groups. Also, the latest Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa protest on 22nd June right in the centre of Islamabad was a stark reminder about ideologically charged curricula which is disseminated in some of these places.

Historically Muslim scholars like Maulana Abul Ala Maududi stressed that madrassahs should not only focus on religious education rather blend it with modern and technical education in order to form an inclusive society. Some of the madrassahs have adopted to such options and are in process of integrating modern education. However, the state has not fully realised the socio-religious and cultural impact that religious education institutions have on the human and security landscape of the country. The quality of education and worldview imparted to madrassah students do not fit national standards because of the absence of technical education in a majority of madrassahs (many of which are also unregulated). Moreover, students at religious seminaries experience a tremendous gap in their socioeconomic standing and employment opportunities in comparison to their counterparts at public, especially private institutions. In addition, religious seminaries pose a security problem as well. Pakistan is a country grappling with terrorism and violent extremism with militant groups and terrorist outfits determined to recruit students from seminaries who usually lack employment opportunities to improve their standard of living. Ideologically charged students, who are taught a very one-sided and narrow view of the world, remain more vulnerable to recruitment for militant and sectarian purposes.

When Muslims ruled over a significant part of the world, madrassahs played an important role as centres of learning and knowledge, so why is it that Pakistan has been unable to reap the true benefits of such institutions and they are seen as hubs of sectarian division and extremism?

The state’s unwillingness (some may call it inability) to reform this sector has many reasons and apparent discrepancies.

Reforming this sector would require state authorities to mainstream (register) all religious seminaries, establish oversight over their funding streams, and regulate their curriculum. This, however, requires strong political will and ample resources. All governments have lacked both. The catch-22 is that the state also refrains from overhauling this problem, considering that madrassahs are serving the educational and basic needs of the underprivileged and impoverished. Furthermore, governments fear backlash from religious and political parties, madrassah establishments as well as people from low-income backgrounds whose children go to these institutions for free.

Another major challenge is the ‘religious elite’. The madrassah sector caters to the needs of the religious elite who – through massive unregulated donations, a large student body and greater social legitimacy due to religious work – wield significant financial and political power. The religious elite, with its share in political and economic spheres, resists any action against madrassahs. Hence, the latter operate like private entities, with teaching and administrative staff enjoying a great amount of freedom and authority. Consequently, the state makes half-hearted efforts at reforms. Moreover, when the government considers madrassahs as centres providing education to the masses, it does not have to cut other public expenditures to fulfill its educational obligations.

No wonder then that there is no vision, policy or strategy to reform or regulate this sector. In fact, the government does not even have a complete database for religious seminaries across the country. In addition, within Pakistan’s large informal economy, donations and funding to religious schools are not traced or monitored.

Despite these challenges persisting for many decades, it has become imperative that someone takes the initiative to bell this cat because the nation can no longer afford to remain at the mercy of religious intolerance and extremism. Even small incremental steps towards change can have a profound and lasting impact.

The first step should be the maintenance of a comprehensive database to take into account the level of enrolment, curriculum-making process and organisational functions of religious schools. The Ministry of Federal Education & Professional Training and Ministry of Interior should manage the registration process. The burden of regulation should not be placed on one institution nor at one administrative level (federal or provincial). Secondly, mainstreaming madrassahs also requires firm curriculum reforms, along with consistent oversight on teaching mechanisms and academic activities. Education is now a provincial matter after the 18th Amendment; therefore, provincial legislative bodies should come up with relevant legislation to regulate and reform the madrassah sector. Lastly, though the Societies Registration Act of 1860 includes a section on the registration and regulation of madrassahs, unfortunately, its implementation is not carried out in the true spirit. Therefore, the laws currently applicable to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) if implemented on madrassahs may help deal with this conundrum on an emergency basis. Regardless of which law is used, more than anything, strong and consistent political will is needed to mainstream madrassahs to eradicate divisions and foster a culture of tolerance in society.

Asad Ullah Khan is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad, Pakistan. The article was first published in Pakistan Observer. He can be reached at [email protected]

Design Credit: Mysha Dua Salman


Share this article

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Recent Publications

Browse through the list of recent publications.

The Cover-up: IAF Narrative of the May 2025 Air Battle

Even after one year since the India-Pakistan May war of 2025, the Indian discourse regarding Operation Sindoor remains uncertain under its pretence of restraint. The Pahalgam attack on 22 April, which killed 26 people, triggered an escalatory spiral. New Delhi quickly accused Pakistan-linked elements, while Islamabad refuted the allegation and demanded an independent investigation. On 7 May, India launched attacks deep inside Pakistan under what it later termed as Operation Sindoor. The political motive was intended to turn the crisis into coercive signalling by shifting the blame onto the enemy and projecting a sense of military superiority.
This episode, however, began to fray immediately as war seldom follows the intended script. Within minutes PAF shot down 7 IAF aircraft including 4 Rafales. On 8 May, Reuters reported that at least two Indian aircraft were shot down by a Pakistani J-10C, while the local government sources reported other aircraft crashes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir

Read More »

Why the IAF’s Post-Sindoor Spending Surge is a Sign of Panic

After Operation Sindoor, India is spending billions of dollars on new weapons. This is being taken by many people as an indication of military prowess. It is not. This rush to procure weapons is in fact an acknowledgement that the Air Force in India had failed to do what it was meant to do. The costly jets and missiles that India had purchased over the years failed to yield the promised results.

Sindoor was soon followed by India in sealing the gaps which the operation had exposed. It was reported that Indian Air Force (IAF) is looking to speed up its purchases of more than 7 billion USD. This will involve other Rafale fighter jets with India already ordering 26 more Rafales to the Navy in 2024 at an estimated cost of about 3.9 billion USD. India is also seeking long-range standoff missiles, Israeli loitering munitions and increased drone capabilities. Special financial powers of the Indian military were activated to issue emergency procurement orders. The magnitude and rate of these purchases speak volumes.

Indian media and defence analysts have over the years considered the Rafale as a game changer. When India purchased 36 Rafales aircrafts at an approximate cost of 8.7 billion USD, analysts vowed that the aircraft would provide India with air superiority over Pakistan. Operation Sindoor disproved all those allegations. Indian aircraft did not even fly in Pakistani airspace when the fighting started. India solely depended on standoff weapons that were launched at a safe distance. The air defence system of Pakistan, comprising of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system and its own fighters, stood its ground.

Read More »

May 2025: Mosaic Warfare and the Myth of Centralised Air Power

Visualise a modern-day Air Force commander sitting in the operations room, miles away from the combat zone, overseeing every friendly and enemy aircraft and all assets involved in the campaign. In a split second, he can task a fighter, reposition a drone, and authorise a strike. In today’s promising technological era, he does not even need an operations room; a laptop on his desktop will suffice. The situation looks promising as it offers efficiency, precision, and control. The term used for such operational control is ‘centralisation’, which has been made possible with advanced networking, integrating space, cyber, surveillance, artificial intelligence, and seamless communication, enabling a single commander to manage an entire campaign from a single node. Centralised command and control, championed by the Western air forces and then adopted by many others, has thus been seen as a pinnacle of modern military power.
The concept of centralisation, enabled by state-of-the-art networking, may seem promising, but it is nothing more than a myth.

Read More »