OA Turf

Considerable controversy has emerged over the Temporary Economic Refinance Facility (TERF), a pandemic-era stimulus program that was launched under the auspices of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) as a concessionary financing facility for capital investment. Under the TERF program, companies could apply through banks for concessional-rate financing for investment expansion or BMR (Balancing, Modernization, and Replacement) programs. The controversy is in the allegation that TERF funds were used selectively with political preferences, given to vested interests and in a manner that would not reflect a “merit-based” approach to credit access.

I have studied and written about pandemic-era stimulus programs in considerable detail and I recognize that in many countries, notably the United States, there was an enormous amount of corruption. The extent of American corruption during Covid-19 is so staggering that it has been termed the “great grift” and the “greatest fraud in a generation,” and this includes both corporations and downright criminals. Should Pakistan’s TERF be seen in the same way?

In my study of Pakistan’s Covid-19 response, as part of a larger corpus of Covid-19 related research at CASS, I have argued that the economic stimulus provided by the government during the pandemic, whether through TERF or otherwise, was an exceptionally important element in the robust policy mix that the country undertook towards weathering the storm of Covid-19. Taken together with other important policy instruments on the public health side, the economic stimulus was a powerful counter-cyclical strategy that helped to keep the most cyclical sectors (textiles, construction, etc.) afloat, and for them to undertake capex at a low rate in anticipation of a global rebound.

This is precisely what the TERF-qualifying companies did, building up or modernizing their equipment in anticipation of the strong (albeit uneven) bounceback of the global economy after the pandemic. Did it work? Sadly, the political instability and global monetary contraction significantly disrupted the anticipated plans of many of the companies envisaging a post-pandemic rebound, and Pakistan has significantly missed the boat, with many industries in fact shuttering their doors under the weight of the polycrisis that has included energy issues, political problems, rampant inflation, and policy mismanagement.

This does not mean that the intentions were bad or that the thinking was wrong. If anything, other actors have much more to answer for the current economic crisis than either the SBP, the commercial banks, or the industrialists do. Insofar as the accusation of preferential treatment in TERF goes, there appears to be little indication that any other selection process would have been both more fair and efficient. Recall that, in those bygone days of the pandemic, uncertainty was terrifying and the future was very difficult to see.

But would anyone else have been more qualified than the recipients who did get TERF financing? The decisions to lend were in the hands of the private banks, not the SBP, and large banks tend to lend to precisely those entities to whom they lent the TERF financing. Therefore, raising the counterfactual of who might have received TERF financing instead seems very silly at this juncture. It would appear that the entities that received financing did use it for BMR and capex investment, and their anticipation for global economic bounce-bank was correct, but tragically sabotaged by the demolition of the Pakistani economy. The countries that actually had major problems with stimulus funds, the worst being the US, have much more to answer to their publics for those stress-era misappropriations.

For Pakistan, the pandemic should be seen as a hallmark of what a country with so many challenges could succeed in achieving when the people and the leadership were of one mind. The pandemic was an equal-opportunity catastrophe for all countries, and the fact that Pakistan had stellar outcomes should be a reminder, particularly during the present difficulties, that the country’s potential to overcome challenges is very impressive. Both in terms of public health and economic outcomes, the effort is one that should not be forgotten.

Dr. Usman W. Chohan is Advisor (Economic Affairs and National Development) at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan. He can be reached at [email protected]


Share this article

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Recent Publications

Browse through the list of recent publications.

The Cover-up: IAF Narrative of the May 2025 Air Battle

Even after one year since the India-Pakistan May war of 2025, the Indian discourse regarding Operation Sindoor remains uncertain under its pretence of restraint. The Pahalgam attack on 22 April, which killed 26 people, triggered an escalatory spiral. New Delhi quickly accused Pakistan-linked elements, while Islamabad refuted the allegation and demanded an independent investigation. On 7 May, India launched attacks deep inside Pakistan under what it later termed as Operation Sindoor. The political motive was intended to turn the crisis into coercive signalling by shifting the blame onto the enemy and projecting a sense of military superiority.
This episode, however, began to fray immediately as war seldom follows the intended script. Within minutes PAF shot down 7 IAF aircraft including 4 Rafales. On 8 May, Reuters reported that at least two Indian aircraft were shot down by a Pakistani J-10C, while the local government sources reported other aircraft crashes in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir

Read More »

Why the IAF’s Post-Sindoor Spending Surge is a Sign of Panic

After Operation Sindoor, India is spending billions of dollars on new weapons. This is being taken by many people as an indication of military prowess. It is not. This rush to procure weapons is in fact an acknowledgement that the Air Force in India had failed to do what it was meant to do. The costly jets and missiles that India had purchased over the years failed to yield the promised results.

Sindoor was soon followed by India in sealing the gaps which the operation had exposed. It was reported that Indian Air Force (IAF) is looking to speed up its purchases of more than 7 billion USD. This will involve other Rafale fighter jets with India already ordering 26 more Rafales to the Navy in 2024 at an estimated cost of about 3.9 billion USD. India is also seeking long-range standoff missiles, Israeli loitering munitions and increased drone capabilities. Special financial powers of the Indian military were activated to issue emergency procurement orders. The magnitude and rate of these purchases speak volumes.

Indian media and defence analysts have over the years considered the Rafale as a game changer. When India purchased 36 Rafales aircrafts at an approximate cost of 8.7 billion USD, analysts vowed that the aircraft would provide India with air superiority over Pakistan. Operation Sindoor disproved all those allegations. Indian aircraft did not even fly in Pakistani airspace when the fighting started. India solely depended on standoff weapons that were launched at a safe distance. The air defence system of Pakistan, comprising of the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system and its own fighters, stood its ground.

Read More »

May 2025: Mosaic Warfare and the Myth of Centralised Air Power

Visualise a modern-day Air Force commander sitting in the operations room, miles away from the combat zone, overseeing every friendly and enemy aircraft and all assets involved in the campaign. In a split second, he can task a fighter, reposition a drone, and authorise a strike. In today’s promising technological era, he does not even need an operations room; a laptop on his desktop will suffice. The situation looks promising as it offers efficiency, precision, and control. The term used for such operational control is ‘centralisation’, which has been made possible with advanced networking, integrating space, cyber, surveillance, artificial intelligence, and seamless communication, enabling a single commander to manage an entire campaign from a single node. Centralised command and control, championed by the Western air forces and then adopted by many others, has thus been seen as a pinnacle of modern military power.
The concept of centralisation, enabled by state-of-the-art networking, may seem promising, but it is nothing more than a myth.

Read More »